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You can't talk sense about this issue if you refuse to use the key term, right of belligerency, which means the right to kill people on the battlefield without being guilty of murder. Article 9 says the Japanese state has not been given this right. Another deception is the use of the expression "the least necessary amount of force". The word "least" makes it sound like something very small. But in war, the least necessary amount of force is the amount necessary to win.
この件については、鍵となる言葉、「交戦権」を論ぜずして理にかなった話をすることはできない。「交戦権」とは、殺人罪に問われることなく戦場で人を殺す権利である。憲法9条は、日本国はこの権利を与えられていないと定めている。もう一つごまかされているのが「最低最小限度の武力」という表現の使い方だ。「最小」という言葉は何か小さなもののような響きがある。しかし戦争における必要最小限度の武力とは、勝つために必要な武力のことである。
I believe the right of belligerency is the precise key to determining what is war and what is not. When you have it, you have the legal right to kill and destroy, and to be treated as a POW when you are captured. When you take military action without it, you are a criminal. It 's extremely interesting that just about everybody wants to carry on this discussion without using the term.
「交戦権」こそが、何が戦争で何が戦争でないかを決定する明確な鍵を握っていると思う。交戦権を持つ場合は、殺し、破壊する法的な権利を持ち、捕われた場合はPOW(戦争捕虜)としての扱いを受ける権利を持つということだ。交戦権なしに武力行使した場合、犯罪者となる。今回誰もこの言葉(「交戦権」)を使わずしてこの議論を続けていることが大変注目すべきことと思っている。
Nuclear power to Tokyo, and Futenma Base to Mainland Japan
Douglas Lummis
Just over thirty years ago the anti-nuclear power activist Hirose Takashi (who I knew because we frequented the same coffee house in Tokyo) said to me, “I have converted to the other side. I am writing a book arguing that nuclear power is safe after all.” He smiled to see how startled I was, and then went on. “Nuclear power is perfectly safe, right? That means there is no reason to build nuclear power plants in such far-away places. Building all those towers and stringing all those long wires costs a lot of money, and then because of the resistance in the wires you lose much of the electricity in the form of heat. Tokyo’s power plants should be built in downtown Tokyo. The electricity would be cheaper, and instead of dumping all that hot water into the ocean as they do now, they could pipe it directly into people’s homes, for cooking, bathing and washing clothes and dishes. If it’s safe, why not?”
The resulting book Nuclear Power Plants to Tokyo! (東京に、原発を! 1981) was a best seller, got a lot of media attention, and made many people very angry. Hirose also made a leaflet, and passed it out to commuters outside Tokyo’s Shinjuku station. Men in business suits would shout at him, “What do you mean! That’s dangerous!” Hirose would say, “Oh, are you against nuclear power?” “No, of course not. But the plants should be put far away from big cities, where fewer people live.” “Oh, you mean somebody else should face the danger, and not you?”
The book was a great success at revealing big-city egotism. The people of Tokyo (and Osaka as well) want the electricity, but not the danger. The same is true today. Many people haven’t grasped the significance of the fact that the melted-down nuclear power plants at Fukushima are owned by the Tokyo Electric Company. The electricity they generated was sent to Tokyo. The people who live in Fukushima get their electricity from a different company.
There is a similar story behind the fact that 75% of the US military bases in Japan are located in tiny Okinawa. The great majority of the Japanese public wants the US military near to (as they imagine) protect them, but not too near. Opinion polls show that over 70% of the Japanese people support the Japan-US Security Treaty, which provides for locating US military bases in Japan. As I wrote last time, far fewer Okinawans support that treaty – in an opinion poll done a few years ago, just 7% responded that they thought the treaty “contributed to the security of East Asia.” Okinawans have no historical memory of a military presence making them safer. The 1945 Battle of Okinawa, in which between a quarter and a third of the Okinawan people were killed, took place because there were Japanese military bases there. And if war comes to Okinawa again, it will be because of the US bases on the islands.
A growing number of Okinawans are becoming sensitive to the fact that this unequal distribution of the bases is a form of discrimination, and that they are being treated as a colony. They are saying, The Yamato Japanese are the ones who want the US military to protect them, so isn’t it reasonable to locate the bases in Yamato Japan? In particular, shouldn’t the US Marine Air Base at Futenma be relocated to mainland Japan rather than to northern Okinawa? So far the Japanese Government absolutely refuses to consider this idea. It is a virtual taboo.
Thus, the anti-base movement in Okinawa is evolving from an anti-war movement to an anti-war/anti-colonial movement.
Last autumn Hirose came to Okinawa to give a talk on the Fukushima disaster, and we talked about the similarity between his “Nuclear power plants to Tokyo” idea, and Okinawa’s “Futenma Marine Base to Yamato Japan” movement. I suggested to him that one difference between them was that his idea was a satire, not meant seriously, whereas the Okinawan idea is meant seriously. But he strongly denied this, and said he was absolutely serious. “I don’t write satires,” he said. “Actually bringing nuclear power plants to Tokyo is the only way those people can be made to understand.”
After his talk in Naha I joined him on the stage for a conversation on just this subject. If you have a computer you can see this (in Japanese) on YouTube at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r6eOAfF56_k
30년 전이었을 거다. 유명한 반핵운동가 히로세 다카시(도쿄에 살 때 우리는 같 은 커피숍을 애용했기 때문에 서로 알게 되었다)가 내게 말했다. “제가 반대편으로 전향했어요. 원자력발전소가 결국은 안전하다고 주장하는 책을 쓰고 있거든요.”
그는 나의 놀라는 표정에도 말을 이어갔다.
“원전은 완벽하게 안전하잖아요. 그 말은 원전을 그렇게 멀리 지을 이유가 없다는 뜻이에요. 그 많은 송전탑을 세우고 장거리 송전선을 걸쳐두는 것은 돈이 엄청나게 많이 들죠. 긴 송전선 때문에 많은 전력이 도중에 유실되지요. 도쿄의 발전소는 도쿄 시내 한가운데 지어야 해요. 그러면 지금보다 전기료가 훨씬 내려갈 거고, 바다에 많은 온배수를 버리는 대신 그 물을 가정에 바로 공급해 요리, 목욕, 세탁, 설거지를 위해 쓸 수 있겠죠. 그게 안전하다면 왜 못하는 거죠?”
그래서 나온 책이 <도쿄에 원전을>(東京に、原發を!, 1981)이다. 이 책은 베스트셀러가 되었고, 언론의 주목을 받았다. 또 많은 사람들을 분노하게 했다. 히로세는 팸플릿을 만들어 도쿄 신주쿠역 앞을 지나가는 사람들에게 나눠줬다. 정장 차림의 사람들은 그에게 소리를 지르곤 했다. “당신 지금 무슨 얘길 하는 거요? 그게 얼마나 위험한데!” 히로세가 답했다. “아, 당신은 원전을 반대하는군요?” “그건 아니에요. 하지만 발전소는 대도시에서 멀리 떨어진 인적이 드문 곳에 있어야 해요.” “아, 그렇다면 당신은 누군가 다른 사람이 그 위험을 떠안고 살아야 한다는 말이군요.”
이 책은 대도시의 이기주의를 까발리는 데 대성공을 거뒀다. 도쿄 사람들은 전기를 원하지, 위험을 원하지는 않는다. 지금도 마찬가지다. 많은 사람들이 노심이 녹아내린 후쿠시마 원전이 도쿄전력 소유라는 사실의 의미를 이해하지 못한다. 원전에서 생산된 전기가 도쿄로 보내진다는 뜻이다. 후쿠시마 사람들은 다른 회사의 전기를 쓰고 있다.
주일 미군기지의 75%가 오키나와라는 작은 섬에 집중돼 있다는 사실도 비슷한 차원에서 설명할 수 있다. 일본인 절대 다수는 미군이 주둔하며 그들을 보호해주길 원한다. 하지만 그들이 너무 가까이 있기를 원하지는 않는다. 여론조사를 보면 일본인 70% 이상이 미군기지 주둔을 가능하게 하는 일·미 안보조약을 지지한다. 하지만 내가 지난번 칼럼에서 썼듯이, 오키나와 사람들은 극소수만이 이 조약을 지지한다. 몇년 전 여론조사에서 7%만이 “일·미 안보조약이 동아시아 안보에 기여하고 있다”고 답했다. 오키나와 사람들은 군대 주둔으로 더 안전해졌다는 역사적 기억이 전혀 없다. 오키나와 사람 4분의 1 내지 3분의 1이 숨진 1945년 ‘오키나와 전투’는 일본 군대가 거기 있었기 때문에 일어났다. 오키나와에 전쟁이 또 일어난다면 이번에는 미군기지 때문일 것이다.
이처럼 불공평한 미군기지 배치가 일종의 지역 차별이라는 사실에 점점 더 많은 오키나와 사람들이 눈을 뜨고 있다. 그들은 미군의 보호를 원하는 사람들은 바로 ‘야마토 일본인’들이니 미군기지들도 일본 본토에 두는 게 합리적이지 않으냐고 말한다. 특히 후텐마의 미 해병대 공군기지는 오키나와 북부보다 일본 본토로 이전해야 하는 것 아니냐는 것이다. 일본 정부는 이 방안을 고려하는 것조차 거부하고 있다. 그 방안은 금기나 마찬가지다. 그리하여 오키나와 미군기지 반대운동은 반전운동에서 반전·반식민주의 운동으로 진화하고 있다.
지난 가을 히로세가 오키나와에 와서 후쿠시마 참사에 대해 얘기할 기회가 있었다. 우리는 ‘원전을 도쿄로’라는 아이디어와 ‘후텐마 기지를 야마토 일본으로’ 운동이 유사성이 있다는 데 공감했다. 나는 그에게 한 가지 차이점이 있다면 히로세의 아이디어는 풍자이고, 미군기지 본토 이전 아이디어는 정말 진지하게 얘기되고 있는 점이라고 말했다. 이에 히로세는 강하게 부정하며, 그 역시 매우 진지하게 원전을 도쿄로 옮기는 운동을 하고 있다고 했다. 그는 “원전을 도쿄로 옮기는 것만이 도시 사람들로 하여금 문제의 심각성을 이해할 수 있게 하는 방안”이라고 말했다. 오키나와 나하에서 그와 대화를 한 뒤 나는 이 주제에 대한 그와의 공개 대담을 가졌다. 대담은 유튜브 동영상(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r6eOAfF56_k)을 참고하면 된다.
Sequel to the previous post, this is the rest of my dialogue with Doug. See previous post here, with explanation of terms like kokugai and kengai.
Dear Doug,
If my memory of what I learned from you before is correct, you said something along the line of calling for unconditional closure of Futenma being equivalent of calling for disbanding of the Futenma USMC units, and that would be unrealistic and irresponsible, because one is not in the position to tell a foreign government what to do with their existing military unit. Please correct me if I am wrong. I think you implied by saying that calling for unconditional closure of Futenma would be asking something impossible, which would be irresponsible, because wanting something impossible would be equivalent of wanting nothing, and that would only perpetuate the status quo, which is unfair base burden of Okinawa: therefore it is colonial.
If my reading you is right, Japanese people are hypocritical if they support Okinawa's call for less bases but support ANPO (Japan-US Security Treaty) at the same time. They should accept base burden in their backyard as long as they support ANPO. But calling for abolishment of ANPO is problematic too, because it is not realistic in any foreseeable future. Again, just talking about something impossible would be the same as talking about nothing, which would be equivalent of approving status quo and that would be colonial.
So, Nakaima's point of kengai, no matter how sincere or insincere his motivation might be, should be emphasized on and should be embraced by the mainland Japanese. Only then Japanese will seriously think about ANPO; they will think more in the same way as Okinawans. They the whole nation will be united to work together against ANPO itself. Is this what you envision?
Going back to the election, what if Iha simply called for kokugai,without specifying the place. It would have been hard for Iha to do, knowing the US plan to move Marines there anyway, on which he has no control on whether he wants it or not. But if he did, would you have supported him more whole-heartedly? For you it would still have been better than his calling for unconditional closure, which would be colonial. Then I wonder why Iha didn't do that: just call for kokugai.What did he gain by talking about Guam, rather than kokugai? I don't have an answer for that.
Touching on what you said about Nakaima reading the situation correctly - if electing a candidate who makes pledges only on reading majority trends in order to win an election is a way for democratic victory, aren't we encouraging any election candidates to read the trend of the time, and if that's the case, in theory all candidates (at least who are ready to win) will have no policy differences. Would that facilitate democracy? No. Citizens will just deprive themselves of their opportunity to voice their position through election, because they will have no choice, as all candidates will already have read the majority opinion. There will be absolutely no room for minority voices, and that would defeat the fundamental purpose of democracy. Do you see the contradiction? By supporting Nakaima's strategy and his victory, are you not voting against democracy itself? Is it not that only in this specific case, Nakaima's victory happened to work for the anti-colonial cause that you support, therefore you support his strategy retrospectively?
Having said this, I agree with the last point you make about his Okinawa nationalism and his anger for Japanese and US governments for their "over-the-head" dealings and decisions. As an Okinawan, I don't think it is hard for him to think this way. But having heard how he justified his previous support for Henoko plan ("I only accepted because Nago said yes"), I can't help thinking in a matter of time he would move so that he would influence the very trend that he would want to read on and act on. I can't help thinking his immediate visit to Tokyo after the election is his first step toward that direction.
Dialogue with you helped me think deeply. Having said all that, I think about the colonial issue you raised more than ever before. Thank you Doug.
Satoko
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Dear Satoko,
I think I see what you are saying about Nakaima and democracy. But it maybe depends on where you look for, to use an old Marxist term,l the agent of change. If you look for Nakaima himself to be the agent of change, of course, what could be more dubious? But I think at this moment the agent of change is the Okinawa electorate. They have changed themselves, they have changed the situation, and as a result they have forced a change in Nakaima - if not in his character, at least in his behavior. He is an effect, not a cause. If he fails in this his political camp will go down to defeat in the next election, and they know it. That's why I think it is not wrong to think of this as a democratic moment.
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Dear Doug,
I see. Nakaima as an effect not a cause makes sense to me. So now our challenge is how to sustain that democratic "moment," as power shifts from the electorate to Nakaima after the election. What we must prevent from happening is him bringing himself down in exchange of a base approval, just like Higa did, and just like Hatoyama did. Another concern is how do LDP and Komeito hold themselves compatible with the fact that they endorsed Nakaima? They won't possibly call for kengai together with Nakaima. They will pressure him to come closer to them, as they regain power in the parliament. These are pessimistic scenarios but we must have them in mind in order to prevent them.
Here is an exchange of emails between Douglas Lummis and me, as he responded to my previous post - comments on the Okinawa gubernatorial election. I wanted to share Doug's insights with a wider audience, and with his kind permission, I am posting below. (Doug's in green letters, and mine in blue. See Gavan McCormack' comment below too.) See HERE for Part II.
(Some Japanese words that frequently appear in the discussion of Futenma "relocation" problem.
Kennai isetsu, or kennai: literally meaning "moving within a prefecture," and in the context of this issue, it means building another base within Okinawa as replacement of MCAS Futenma.
Kengai isetsu, or kengai: literally meaning "moving outside of prefecture," and in the context of this issue, it means building a new facility in a place other than Okinawa but within Japan, and/or using or upgrading existing facilities within Japan (but not in Okinawa) to transfer the functions of MCAS Futenma.
Kokugai isetsu, or kokugai: moving outside the country. )
Thanks for forwarding your piece on the Okinawa gubernatorial election. But I have to say that I think you are missing something very important. Or at the very least, that there are other ways of looking at the result.
I think it’s wrong to say that the Okinawan voters have been deceived. Rather, I think they understood pretty clearly the choice they were making.
The main significance of this election was that neither of the serious candidates supported the DPJ line, i.e. that the US Marine Air Station at Futenma should be moved to Henoko. The only party that supported that idea was the Kofuku Jitsugen To. They spent a huge amount of money on the election, and brought in an army of volunteers from mainland Japan. Their flags and posters and soundtrucks were everywhere. And they got 2% of the vote.
And the voters also didn’t support Iha’s vagaries about Guam. By vagary I mean that he tried to avoid saying directly that he supported moving the base to Guam (saying that he was only revealing that the US had such a plan) while at the same time making clear that he saw this as a solution to the problem, and occasionally forgetting himself and saying that he did support it. Several years ago I heard him give a talk on the Guam option, after which someone asked from the floor, “What about the anti-base movement in Guam?” Iha’s answer was (I quote from memory) “That’s very small, negligible, nothing to worry about.” In the present election, a person in Iha’s camp who had been very active in opposing the Guam option and supporting solidarity with the Guam anti-base movement, was asked how she could campaign for Iha. She answered, “Oh, that’s a lie (uso). He doesn’t really favor it. He’s just saying that to win the election.” Another person working in the Iha camp told me that he thinks the woman was engaging in wishful thinking, to make it possible to work with Iha. That’s how vague it was: even people working in his campaign couldn’t agree on what Iha really meant.
I think the Okinawa voters should be admired for voting against moving the base to an even more powerless colony. A Chamorro woman who came to Okinawa last June said at a rally, “Please understand that Guam is not America. Guam belongs to America.” She pointed out that Guamanians have no vote in U.S. national elections and so can be, and are, politically ignored.
As for Nakaima’s changed position; yes, of course, it would be wrong to trust him; he has to be watched and pressured constantly. But remember the reason he changed was because his advisors (principally Naha Mayor Onaga it seems) told him that you can no longer win an election in Okinawa by saying you support, or will accept, moving the base to Henoko. So both candidates opposed Henoko plan, but they constructed their opposition differently. Iha said, I oppose the base; I as Governor will prevent its construction. Nakaima said (in effect), it doesn’t matter what I think. The people of Okinawa have made it impossible to build the base. It can’t be done. So which is the more democratic?
The other big difference is that Iha said absolutely nothing about the option of moving the base to mainland Japan. There were several reasons for this. One would like to believe that as a pacifist, he could not in good conscience support the base being simply moved to another location, but would rather see it abolished altogether. But if so, he had no business pushing the Guam option. More importantly, he is very much dependent on the mainland anti-war movement for support, and doesn’t want to say anything to anger them. And talking about the mainland option does anger Japanese anti-war people immensely. Secondly, if he had taken that position the Japan Communist Party would not have supported him. As it was, the JCP also sent an army of volunteers from the mainland to work in his campaign. From Iha soundtrucks you could hear voices saying (in mainland accents) things like, “Okinawans! Please get rid of your bases!). This kind of preaching did not, I think, help his cause much.
Nakaima took the position known here as kengai isetsu (県外移設) which literally means, move out of the prefecture, but is understood to mean, move to mainland Japan. That he won the election on this slogan marks a sea change in Okinawan opinion. It changes the terms of the debate. What had been a purely anti-war, anti-base discourse is now one in which anti-colonialism and anti-discrimination are also an isue. He said, these bases are not Okinawa’s responsibility, they are Yamato Japan’s responsibility. (He uses the Okinawan expression Yamatuu which expresses a mild level of anger or distain, comparable perhaps to an American Black’s use of the term honky). Until recently it was only a small minority who took this position, and received a lot of abuse for taking it. Nakaima, who owes nothing to the Japanese peace movement or to the JCP, has brought it into mainstream discourse, and won an election on it. Again, you can’t catch the significance of this only within a war-antiwar or left-right framework; you have to see it in a colonial-anticolonial framework. It may be that some people in Tokyo felt relief at Nakaima’s victory, but I think that only means they haven’t grasped the situation. Only 2% of the voters here supported the Tokyo government’s position, this despite all the fuss about fearsome Chinese fishing boats and North Korean artillery. 98% voted against it. And Nakaima, if he keeps his promise (and the pressure on him to do so will be huge) is going to dump the base issue right back onto Tokyo’s lap. I don’t know, but I wouldn’t be surprised to see another prime minister knocked out of office by this.
Be Well,
Doug
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Dear Doug,
I have been thinking about what you wrote.
I wonder if people rejected the Happy party (Kofuku Jitsugen To: see John Feffer's assessment of this party in Foreign Policy in Focus) because of their politics or because they are simply crazy. I saw their disgusting propaganda video. I would not draw too much attention on the Happy by stressing the 98-2 ratio. I would not use it. I supported Iha because of his principle to oppose the Henoko plan. I agree to the idea of taking Nakaima's kengaipledge as hostage and use that to pressure him, but for me using the 98 number would mean to support Nakaima retrospectively, which I can't possibly pretend to do, just because he won more votes than Iha. If you began by supporting Nakaima, fine, and that's what you did maybe, but if not, I think it would be a wrong thing to do. One might say that saying 98% is not a retrospective support for Nakaima, but simply an observation of the result. But I would say no. I would not take advantage of whom I opposed in order to make my point.
Do you support Nakaima because of his kengai choice? But is he sincere about this? As soon as he was elected, Nakaima said, before he only accepted the Henoko plan because Nago City said "yes." Nakaima should have known that Nago's "yes" was a result of dirty dealings behind the series of events in 1997/1998 (Nago's plebscite in which the majority said "no" to the base - mayor Higa's betrayal and resignation - then mayoral election in which pro-base Kishimoto won - gubernatorial election in which Ota was defeated by pro-base Inamine. See my second comment at the end of my election post at this link for details.)Applying that logic, if all the other prefectures say no to kengai, and if there is one vulnerable community somewhere in Okinawa that's made to say "yes" with a similar mechanism that brought Nago to say "yes" before, Nakaima will just jump on the opportunity. He has no principle. I can't even see any sign of his saying kengai from an anticolonial principle. To me, it sounds worlds apart when you say kengai and when he says it.
One thing I haven't been able to figure about Iha is exactly what you said. He said he wasn't endorsing it; he was only revealing the Pentagon documents about it and was holding US and Japanese governments accountable for them. But he changed, especially during the election, he openly started to say Guam. I can guess different scenarios why he chose to do so, but it is meaningless to go into speculation at this point.
One thing I was totally unaware of is JCP's pressure on Iha. Thank you for that information.
What you have been saying and writing has brought awareness about the implication of kengai, and that would be the only thing about Nakaima that I would support, but again, I can't help thinking Nakaima's practical strategy only happened to fit in that anticolonial expectation. I am not saying he doesn't have that value in him; as an Okinawan of course he should.
Thank you Doug,
Satoko
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Dear Satoko,
Thanks for your thoughtful note. I should make clear that, if I had the right to vote in Okinawa, I would have voted for Iha, not at all happily, with deep reservations, but he would have got my vote. This is partly because of Nakaima’s support for the SDF, and partly because I like the people around Iha a lot better. If he had gotten elected, I would have joined those among his supporters who were preparing, were he elected, to lobby him to shut up about Guam. (One reason he was defeated was that there were a lot of people on his team who were less than enthusiastic). I went with my family to his final rally on the Saturday night before the election, and we were among the many hundreds of people he shook hands with there.
But I still think that the big significance of this election is that both of the serious candidates, from their different angles, opposed moving the base to Henoko. Of course you are right that the Happy Party, as you aptly call them, are a pack of crazies, and just about everybody knows that. But you can run that the other way: in this election the only people to support the government position was a pack of crazies. Yes, if the DPJ had fielded a candidate they would have got more than 2%, but they still would have suffered a humiliating loss, which is presumably why they didn’t run anybody. Around the time of the Hatoyama resignation, an opinion poll showed Okinawan support for the Japan-US Security Treaty at 6% (Compared to over 60% in mainland Japan) with support for the DJP just a few points more.
On Iha and Guam, either he supported the option, which is I think a shameful position, or he didn’t but said he did in order to win the election, which is also not so admirable. In either case, I think Guam for him was a ploy to allow him to talk about getting rid of the Futenma base without either dealing in unpersuasive abstractions (the base should be banished from the world) or offending Japan (kengai isetsu). If he had won the election I think he would have had to stop talking about it, because the question of where the US should locate its bases outside Japanese territory is outside the Okinawa Governor’s, and the Japanese Government’s, jurisdiction. In the event, the ploy did not win him the election. And with his defeat, I suspect the Guam option will fade from public discourse here.
On Nakaima, again, it’s not a question of liking or trusting him. You are right to point out that he has on his record support for the phoney “consent” that was bulldozed out of the city of Nago. (But remember Iha has on his record now virtual support for a similar process in Guam). But in this election, the great thing is that Nakaima read the situation correctly: you can’t win an election here by saying you will accept a base at Henoko. Depending on how you look at it, you could say he is just an opportunist, or you could say it is a victory for democracy. You could say he is deceiving the voters, or you could say that the voters have forced him to change his position. The important thing not to sit back and see which of these turns out to be true, but to make sure that the latter proves true. That is, by no means to relax and leave it up to him, but to watch him like a hawk, and to jack up the pressure. At the same time I am increasingly getting the impression that he may be serious in his nationalism, and in his anger (in some situations, anger is the healthy response) toward Japan. There’s no necessary contradiction between being a conservative and being a nationalist. The old curmudgeon is saying some pretty tough and interesting things these days. With regard to the unequal distribution of the bases, he is able to use the word “discrimination”, a word that doesn’t seem to be included in Iha’s vocabulary. I am wondering whether it may sometimes happen that a politician takes a position opportunistically, and after repeating it over and over on many occasions, comes to discover that he believes it.
C. Douglas Lummis, a former US Marine stationed on Okinawa, is the author of Radical Democracy and other books in Japanese and English. A Japan Focus associate, he formerly taught at Tsuda College. See this LINK for a list of Doug's articles on Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus.
Here is an article about Smedley Butler (1881-1940), written by Douglas Lummis, a political scientist living in Okinawa.
The Great Smedley Butler
by Douglas Lummis
Shukan ST, 22 March, 2002
Smedley Butler
Among the many U.S military bases on Okinawa, there is one called CampButler. It was named after one of the most famous and colorful officers in U.S. Marine Corps history, Smedley D. Butler.
Smedley Butler joined the Marines in 1898 at the age of 16, in time to participate in the war in Cuba. (That was when the U.S. obtained its base at Guantanamo Bay.) From Cuba he was sent to the Philippines to help suppress the independence movement there.
In 1900 Butler was part of the multinational force sent by the Great Powers into China during the Boxer Rebellion. He was wounded twice, but recovered well enough to participate in the sacking of Beijing.
From there Butler's story is a history of the U.S. Marines in the first three decades of the 20th century. After China he was in Honduras, then Panama, then the Philippines again. In 1912 he helped rig elections to form a U.S.-friendly government in Nicaragua. In 1914 he entered Mexico as a spy to draw up plans for U.S. military intervention in the Mexican Revolution. (Later that year U.S. Marines ans sailors did land in Mexico and seize Vera Cruz, but with little effect on the revolution.)
The following year Butler was in Haiti, where he helped set up a U.S.-friendly puppet government and forced the adoption of a new constitution that had been written by U.S. government officials. And so on. Butler was awarded two Congressional Medals of Honor for heroism in combat. Probably many of the Marines at Camp Butler and other Marine bases in Japan know these Smedley Butler stories. But I wonder how many know how he spent the last years of his life. After his retirement in 1931, at the rank of major general, Butler became a popular public speaker. And he began to think about what he had been doing. He decided that for most of his career he had been a "racketeer for capitalism."
In in 1935 he wrote, "I helped make Mexico . . . safe for American oil interest in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys . . . I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909-1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras 'right' for American fruit companies in 1903. In China, in 1927, I helped to see to it that Standard Oil went its way unmolested."
"Looking back on it," he continued, "I feel I might have given Al Capone a few hints. The best he could do was to operate his racket in three city districts. We Marines operated on three continents."
Butler did not become a pacifist, but he argued that the U.S.; military should be used for defense only, and should be withdrawn from all foreign countries. When the Marine Corps gave his name to a base in Okinawa, what that ignorance or was it an intentional insult?
References: Maverick Marine: General Smedley Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History by Hans Schmidt (The University Press of Kentucky, 1987); War is a Racket" by Smedley D Butler (Round Table Press,1935). C. Douglas Lummis, a political scientist and a former US Marine stationed on Okinawa, is the author of Radical Democracy and other books in Japanese and English. A Japan Focus associate, he formerly taught at Tsuda College.
Bridging Nikkei Generations and Beyong through the Transitional "Article 9" Movement
By Chikako Nagayama
TORONTO–The May 15th event entitled“Article 9 of Japanese Constitution: Bringing Peace into Today's World” was the first collective initiative that introduced Toronto to the peace clause of Japan's Constitution, “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes…” However, the clause has been under constant pressure for change.
Over 80 people attended the gathering at the Ontario Institute of Studies in Education (OISE) of the University of Toronto to learn about the historical and current analysis about Japan's remilitarization.
Author Joy Kogawa's opening remarks illustrated a complexity of the Japanese Canadian's position on discussing the forced relocation of Japanese descendants by the Canadian government, on one hand, and the massacre, rape and biological experiments on Chinese civilians by the Japanese imperial army, on the other.
Vancouver-born Kogawa recollected that the notions of the 'Japanese' she learned through her upbringing-love for family, industriousness and humbleness-were denied when her family were conceived as 'Japs' during the war. The brutality,backwardness and deception of the 'Jap' race were no longer a fabricated myth when backed up by the actual military violence.
Kogawa concluded, “if we lose Article 9, we will lose what is most mature, most humane, decent and hopeful in a world of conflict.”
Subsequently, the 78-minute documentary, Japan's Peace Constitution (Director John Junkerman, 2005), presented diverse advocatory arguments. Because the 1946 constitution was composed under the Allied occupation, today's Japanese nationalists would criticize that Article 9 as merely imposed on Japan by the General Headquarters (GHQ).
Two draft constitutions were prepared by Japanese research groups and one by GHQ. In the documentary film, Beate Sirota-Gordon bluntly reveals that the GHQ draft was prepared in a week by researchers like her who were new to the task.
While referencing constitutions of Weimer Germany, the Soviet Union and Scandinavian countries, Sirota-Gordon was instrumental in implementing the welfare rights of women in Japan, which were not realized in the U.S.constitution.
Former American marine and now resident in Okinawa, C. Douglas Lummis maintains that the constitution is an order from the citizens to the government, not an order from above. Historian Rokuro Hidaka advances that the peace constitution is Japan's apology to Asian people.
Whereas filmmaker Ban Zhongyi and feminist activist Shin Heisoo testify that Japan's military atrocities are vividly remembered and not yet brought to justice, journalists Michel Kilo and Josef Samaha implicate that the expansion of Japan's Self Defense Force to support US military operations is not only exasperating to neighbouring nations but also to the Middle East. The peace clause has been pressured to accommodate the de facto military alliance granted by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan.
Satoko Norimatsu, the director of the Peace Philosophy Centre based in Vancouver, called attention to the “New Constitution” draft, released by the Liberal Democratic Party in October 2006. LDP proposes to remove the prohibition against the possession of armed forces and the denial of the nation's right of belligerency from the current constitution. (Photo by Yusuke Tanaka)
The draft intends to allow Japan's right to exercise collective self-defense, which means Japan would 'fight back' at any country that attacks the U.S. Norimatsu asserted that this would deprive Article 9 of the suppressing role that has been played so far. “It is true that the government did dispatch the Self Defense Forces to the Indian Ocean,” she said. “But the SDF's duties were limited to providing logistical support for activities not directly related to theuse of force, and within non-combatant areas.”
Following Norimatsu, Yusuke Tanaka, an immigrant journalist, recalled one of the peaks of the global peace movement in May 1972 in Tokyo. The key issues were the Vietnam War and the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. Tanaka emphasized that the U.S. military base in Okinawa is the largest in Asia, and Okinawans continue to be marginalized by Japanese mainlanders.
In 2007, the Ministry of Education ordered the modification of history textbooks' account of the battle of Okinawa at the end of the Asia Pacific war, so that Japanese army's enforcement of residents' mass suicide was ambiguated. Met by angry protests by political leaders and activists from Okinawa, the ministry acknowledged that the army was the cause of the mass suicide.
“Article 9 should not be treated as a national treasure,” stated Tanaka, alluding that the false notion of Japan as a peaceful country could further the neglect of discrimination issue against the Okinawans.
While the influence of the U.S. military was repeatedly highlighted throughout the panel,Peter Kuznick offered insights into how people's patriotic consciousness can be challenged. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial reinforces patriotism by commemorating 58,000 deaths of American soldiers while excluding nearly four million casualties of Vietnamese soldiers and civilians.
As professor of the Nuclear Studies Institute at American University in Washington D.C., Kuznick has taken his students to annual study trips to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in collaboration with Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto, Japan,since 1995. He also complicated the impression of General Douglas McArthur, who tends to be depicted as a saviour to Japan. McArthur believed that the Atomic bomb was not needed to end the war.
However, Kuznick pointed out, he was at the same time responsible for maintaining the Emperor system, and later wanted to use the Abomb to attack China. Although it is commonly said that nuclear weapons were only used twice in history, Kuznick stressed, it is rather like a gun, which allows the control of others without pulling the trigger.
Hiroshima survivor Setsuko Thurlow followed to tell that the transition from restrictive, hierarchical imperialist society to post-1945democracy was liberating, but GHQ did not do justice to A-bomb survivors when they sent doctors only to investigate effects of the bomb but not to rescue the wounded. GHQ censored publications and confiscated personal correspondences on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
As Norimatsu suggested, Article 9 associations are rapidly growing across Japan and overseas. The movement for preserving and realizing the peace clause now counts over 7000 groups in Japan. Norimatsu and David McIntosh of the Toronto Article 9 Event Committee are among the original members of the Vancouver Save Article 9 launched in May 2005.
From May 4 to 6, 2008, the first international Article 9 conference was held in Japan, and was attended by over 30,000 people from Japan and overseas. Four students from Canada were given the opportunity to attend the conference with the help of funds raised.
The May 15 event highlighted the unique capacity of urban metropolises such as Toronto and Vancouver to connect transnational movements and mediate Nikkei generations, given the large size of their communities and active pursuit of exchanges fostered therein.
Chikako Nagayama is completing her Ph.D. at the Department of Sociology and Equity Studies in Education at OISE/UT in summer 2009.