Here is RT's three-minute program on US Empire of Bases.
Thursday, February 17, 2011
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Japan has lived and kept Article 9, and it will: David Rothauser's Letter to the Japan Times ジャパン・タイムズへの投稿：日本は九条と非核三原則を守り主権と独立を保つ
Here is a letter by filmmaker David Rothauser, director of film "Hibakusha, Our Life to Live," regarding the Japan Times' article "U.S. says Article 9 limits close defense cooperation." The Japan Times did not print his letter, so with David's permission, we are posting this important voice from the US, in support of Japan's Peace Constitution. See HERE for the Japan Times article David is responding to.
U.S. says Article 9 limits close defense cooperation
David Rothauser
MEMORY Productions
39 Fuller Street
Brookline, MA 02446
617 232-4150
http://www.hibakusha-ourlifetolive.org/
U.S. says Article 9 limits close defense cooperation
If one reads between the lines of this article, "U.S. says Article 9 limits close defense cooperation," it is easy to see that the U.S. and possibly Japan are preparing to go to war against North Korea U.S. and Japan U.S. has been pressuring Japan to drop Article 9 since 1950 when the U.S. wanted Japan Japan Japan and the U.S.
David Rothauser
MEMORY Productions
39 Fuller Street
Brookline, MA 02446
617 232-4150
http://www.hibakusha-ourlifetolive.org/
For more information on David's film on atomic-bomb survivors, see HERE.
Tuesday, February 15, 2011
Kyodo News : 2 Congressmen "US Troops Out of Japan" 共同ニュース 米２議員「米軍は日本撤退すべき」
Two congressmen spoke of their opinion that the US troops should withdraw from Japan, from different perspectives. It is good to know that Ron Paul has that imagination of foreign troops in the backyard of US citizens.
http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/2-congressmen-call-for-pullout-of-u-s-forces-from-japan
2 congressmen call for pullout of U.S. forces from Japan
Wednesday 16th February, 11:00 AM JST
WASHINGTON —
He also dismissed the view that U.S. forces in Japan serve as deterrence, saying this is an ‘‘excuse’’ to maintain a U.S. military presence in the region.
‘‘What if China wanted a base in New York City? We’d be furious,’’ Paul said.
The problem in Okinawa is not U.S. Marine troops but ‘‘the people in Washington that send them there,’’ Kucinich said, adding, ‘‘This is an issue that Congress must take up with the White House so that we can make sure that the concerns of the residents of Okinawa are taken into consideration.’’
以下、東京新聞などに報道された共同通信の記事。
在日米軍は撤収すべき
財政赤字でベテラン議員
【ワシントン共同】米下院のロン・ポール議員（共和党）とデニス・クシニッチ議員（民主党）は１５日までにそれぞれ共同通信との単独会見に応じ、日本駐留を含む米軍の前方展開戦略が「財政上の問題になっている」（ポール氏）と述べ、米財政赤字が最悪規模に膨らむ中、在日米軍は撤収すべきだとの考えを示した。
孤立主義外交を唱えるポール氏は保守層に人気があり、クシニッチ氏は民主党内で最もリベラル派の一人として支持を集める。いずれも過去に大統領選に挑戦した経験を持つベテラン議員で、在日米軍を維持する「余裕はない」（クシニッチ氏）と共通認識を訴えた。
米軍は、８日発表した指針「国家軍事戦略」で「北東アジアの戦力を今後数十年間堅持する」と明記。米議会内にも台頭する中国や核問題を抱える北朝鮮を念頭に、在日米軍の重要性を説く声が依然としてある。
しかし、ポール氏は「日本がすべての責任を自ら負う時だ」とし、平和と安全を確保する上で米軍依存をやめるべきだと主張。在日米軍は抑止力だとする議論は軍事的プレゼンスを維持するための「口実だ」と一蹴した。
クシニッチ氏も「米国に世界の警察を務める金はない」と強調。在日米軍を「過去の遺物」と呼んだ上で「移転して軍事優先政策から脱却すべきだ」と述べた。中国についてクシニッチ氏は「中国が関心あるのは戦争ではなく、金もうけ」と述べ、軍事力ではなく金融政策を通じて対抗すべきだと語った。
両氏は外国軍の基地を周辺に抱える住民の感情は理解できるとし、ポール氏は「中国軍がニューヨークに基地を持とうとしたら、われわれは怒り狂うだろう」と指摘。クシニッチ氏は「問題なのは海兵隊員ではなく、彼らを派遣する政治だ」と述べ、沖縄県民の不安や懸念の解消に向けて米政府に働き掛けを続ける考えを示した。
http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/2-congressmen-call-for-pullout-of-u-s-forces-from-japan
2 congressmen call for pullout of U.S. forces from Japan
Wednesday 16th February, 11:00 AM JST
 |
| Ron Paul (photo from Tokyo Shimbun) |
 |
| Dennis Kucinich |
Two veteran U.S. congressmen have called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Japan amid the ballooning U.S. budget deficit.
‘‘It’s becoming a financial issue,’’ Ron Paul, a Republican House of Representatives member from Texas, said in a recent interview with Kyodo News, indicating that maintaining U.S. forces in Japan has become a financial burden for Washington.
Dennis Kucinich, a Democrat member from Ohio, said in a separate interview, ‘‘The United States truly cannot afford to construct the new base in Okinawa. Nor can it afford to have a military presence across the globe.’‘
Kucinich and Paul are heavyweights in the House, and both have experience of seeking the presidency. Paul, an advocate of isolationism, is supported by conservatives, while Kucinich is popular as one of the most liberal figures among the Democrats.
Last week, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff unveiled their latest National Military Strategy report pledging to maintain a strong U.S. military presence in northeast Asia for decades.
Some members of Congress say it is important for the United States to keep forces in Japan as China’s military presence is growing in the region while North Korea continues to act provocatively.
The two lawmakers, however, are opposed to continued stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.
‘‘China’s interested in making money, not war,’’ Kucinich said.
Paul argued Tokyo should end its dependence on U.S. forces for its defense, saying, ‘‘It’s time for Japan to assume all of their own responsibilities.’‘
‘‘For a long time I was probably the only one’’ who proposed such a view, he said, adding, ‘‘Now we’re getting more support.’‘
Kucinich is also critical of the current U.S. military strategy. ‘‘We don’t have the money to be the policemen of the world. And we should stop pretending that we do,’’ he said.
Describing the U.S. military bases in Japan as ‘‘really part of a bygone era,’’ Kucinich urged the two countries to move away from a relationship prioritizing military cooperation.
‘‘We have a strong friendship with Japan. That friendship is not dependent on a military presence,’’ he said.
Both Paul and Kucinich said they can understand the feeling of local people in Okinawa Prefecture where a host of U.S. bases are located. Local opposition remains strong against a plan to relocate a U.S. base within the prefecture.
‘‘What if China wanted a base in New York City? We’d be furious,’’ Paul said.
The problem in Okinawa is not U.S. Marine troops but ‘‘the people in Washington that send them there,’’ Kucinich said, adding, ‘‘This is an issue that Congress must take up with the White House so that we can make sure that the concerns of the residents of Okinawa are taken into consideration.’’
以下、東京新聞などに報道された共同通信の記事。
在日米軍は撤収すべき
財政赤字でベテラン議員
【ワシントン共同】米下院のロン・ポール議員（共和党）とデニス・クシニッチ議員（民主党）は１５日までにそれぞれ共同通信との単独会見に応じ、日本駐留を含む米軍の前方展開戦略が「財政上の問題になっている」（ポール氏）と述べ、米財政赤字が最悪規模に膨らむ中、在日米軍は撤収すべきだとの考えを示した。
孤立主義外交を唱えるポール氏は保守層に人気があり、クシニッチ氏は民主党内で最もリベラル派の一人として支持を集める。いずれも過去に大統領選に挑戦した経験を持つベテラン議員で、在日米軍を維持する「余裕はない」（クシニッチ氏）と共通認識を訴えた。
米軍は、８日発表した指針「国家軍事戦略」で「北東アジアの戦力を今後数十年間堅持する」と明記。米議会内にも台頭する中国や核問題を抱える北朝鮮を念頭に、在日米軍の重要性を説く声が依然としてある。
しかし、ポール氏は「日本がすべての責任を自ら負う時だ」とし、平和と安全を確保する上で米軍依存をやめるべきだと主張。在日米軍は抑止力だとする議論は軍事的プレゼンスを維持するための「口実だ」と一蹴した。
クシニッチ氏も「米国に世界の警察を務める金はない」と強調。在日米軍を「過去の遺物」と呼んだ上で「移転して軍事優先政策から脱却すべきだ」と述べた。中国についてクシニッチ氏は「中国が関心あるのは戦争ではなく、金もうけ」と述べ、軍事力ではなく金融政策を通じて対抗すべきだと語った。
両氏は外国軍の基地を周辺に抱える住民の感情は理解できるとし、ポール氏は「中国軍がニューヨークに基地を持とうとしたら、われわれは怒り狂うだろう」と指摘。クシニッチ氏は「問題なのは海兵隊員ではなく、彼らを派遣する政治だ」と述べ、沖縄県民の不安や懸念の解消に向けて米政府に働き掛けを続ける考えを示した。
Sunday, February 13, 2011
Former PM Hatoyama Interview: "Deterrence" was a "Pretext" to Justify Henoko Plan 鳩山元首相インタビュー：「抑止力は方便」
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| Former PM Hatoyama interviewed - Photo from Ryukyu Shimpo |
Hatoyama's Confession: The Myth of Deterrence and the Failure to Move a Marine Base Outside Okinawa
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Norimatsu-Satoko/3495
（鳩山首相が共同通信等のインタビューに答え、普天間移設問題については「県外」を約束していたにも関わらず最終的に辺野古案に戻ったときの理由を「抑止力」としたことについての真相を語った。海兵隊が直接「抑止力」にはならないということはわかっていたが、移設案が辺野古に戻ったことの「理由づけ」をしなけばいけなかったので「抑止力」という言葉を使ったこと、それを「方便と言われれば方便だが。」と答えたことが明らかになった。日本語を読む人は一番下に琉球新報、沖縄タイムスの関連記事のリンクがあるので読んでください。）
Former Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio's interview with Kyodo News, Okinawa Taimusu and Ryukyu Shimpo revealed some answers to unanswered questions, particularly what Hatoyama meant by "deterrence" when he stressed the importance of the US Marines in Okinawa. He gave up the his election pledge of moving Futenma Air Station outside of Okinawa, instead of building a "replacement" base within the island already cluttered with US military bases, mere legacy of WWII and Cold War.
The answer was that he only used the word "deterrence" to justify the Henoko plan when he thought there was no other option available. It was purely an excuse; nothing substantial.
Here is a translation from the interview (translation and notes by PP, based on the text of the interview on Ryukyu Shimpo, Sunday February 13).
Interview: The Hatoyama revelations
Q: What did you have in mind when you called for Futenma to be relocated “at least out-of-Okinawa [elsewhere in Japan](kengai)” during the 2009 election?
Hatoyama: "In view of the reality of the excessive burden of the bases on Okinawa and in order to alleviate the suffering of the Okinawan people, the DPJ as a party had decided in its "Okinawa Vision” on “at least out-of-Okinawa”. It was not just Hatoyama bringing it up on his own initiative, but I raised the party’s core thinking with great expectations. It was not so much that I had a clear view of how to proceed, but I said that out of my sense of responsibility something had to be done.
Q. Why did the idea not prevail within the cabinet and within the party after you became Prime Minister?
Hatoyama: Amidst the difficulties following assumption of power, many realized it would not be easy and gave up. There was an overwhelming atmosphere within the government that it would be difficult to relocate Futenma outside of the prefecture, let alone outside Japan, based on the thinking within Defence and Foreign Affairs, and on the accumulation of events, and that atmosphere still remains. Such thinking prevailed within the Cabinet, with only myself and a few others wanting to move the base outside of Okinawa.
Q. Did you expect this to be a big issue?
Hatoyama: I was not expecting that it would be such a big matter as to become the reason for my resignation as Prime Minister.
Q. Why did you put a seal on the idea of a US-Japan security treaty without permanent [US] troop presence?
Hatoyama: I still have that belief. I used to call for it in the old DPJ, but unfortunately, once the DPJ took office, it was not able to win support. On the Futenma problem too, even though I did not use the actual expression “without permanent bases,” I wanted to lead things in that direction, so I often spoke of “outside Japan, or at least outside Okinawa.”
Q. Statements by your Cabinet ministers were all inconsistent.
Hatoyama: Although Okada (Katsuya), then Foreign Minister, said that we had not actually written “Futenma outside of Okinawa” in the party’s manifesto, I thought that, since we constituted the core of government and enjoyed overwhelming popular support, we should clearly articulate and implement the party’s vision. I wanted Okada to act on that vision.
Q. Why did you not form the Cabinet in such a way as to be able to realize your vision of a security Treaty "without permanent bases"? Why did you choose Kitazawa (Toshimi) as Defense Minister?
Hatoyama: Kitazawa was Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, and was supposed to have a stable vision for defense-related matters. Rather than appointing ministers on specific themes, we had lists of candidates, and placed the most suitable person in each position. Defense Minister Kitazawa’s challenge was how to transcend the Defense Ministry’s ways of thinking and to propose new ways of thinking. He should have put more effort into it.
Q. Was it the case that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence had cultures resistant to new thinking?
Hatoyama: Yes, such a culture was very strong. It seemed as if my ideas were scornfully dismissed. MOFA and MOD, while they should have been thinking through the base transfer issue with me, instead chose to give priority to what had been agreed with the US (a new base in Okinawa). Once, after summoning two senior members of these ministries to my residence and telling them that we would constitute a team to deal with this, stressing the importance of confidentiality, the matter was reported in the following day’s papers. I was greatly saddened. I did not know whom to trust. After much effort during the LDP time, the MOFA and MOD had come to a single solution – transfer within Okinawa, and saw no alternative. A determination to push things gradually in such a direction seemed to be at work. In dealing with the Americans, there was nothing for it but to trust them. When we reached the point where anything else was futile, I could go no further and I came to doubt my own strength.
Q. Did you have any allies?
Hatoyama: Then Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano was cooperative in exploring possibilities of Tokunoshima Island.11 I had at least one ally.
Q. Did you not consider appointing a secret mission to negotiate with the US on your behalf?
Hatoyama: Yes, and I almost had somebody for that purpose, but things were difficult.
Q. It sounded like something out of the blue when you came up with "deterrence" as a reason to build a replacement base in Okinawa.
Hatoyama: When Tokunoshima Island (in Kagoshima Prefecture) refused to host an alternative facility, we had no choice but to move it to Henoko, so I had to come up with a rationale to justify it. I didn't think the presence of Marines in Okinawa would work directly as deterrence against war, but without the Marines, the US military would not be able to function fully in terms of interoperability, and that would affect deterrence. As for the deterrent effect of the Marines themselves, you all think they are not a deterrent, and that is also my understanding. If you say it was a pretext, then it was a pretext. But I thought I could still use the word “deterrence” in a broader sense.
Q. Your statement during the meeting with President Obama drew much attention.12
Hatoyama: I said, "Trust me," because I believed that I would be able to work out a plan agreeable both to Okinawans and the US. I used those words, meaning to ask President Obama to trust me as a person. Last July (2010), I received a hand-written letter from President Obama that said, "You were faithful to your words." According to the media, I damaged US-Japan relations, but that is not true, at least it was not true as of July last year. I feel sorry that the current plan is not something that Okinawan people can understand. It is true that trust between the Japanese government and Okinawa was severely damaged, and for that I am really sorry. I regret it very much.
Q. At the end of 2009, had you not already given up on the idea of moving Futenma out of Okinawa?
Hatoyama: Even when I used the words “trust me,” the prospect of moving Futenma to another part of Japan was grim. Already then the understanding had been reached along the lines eventually announced on 28 May. I would be lying if I said that at that time (the end of 2009) I did not think about asking Okinawans to accept the plan to build a replacement base in Henoko as the inevitable option. However, while consulting with Okinawa Governor Nakaima (Hirokazu), I chose to delay the ultimate decision until May 2010, thinking that this plan would betray the Okinawan people and would not survive politically.
Q. Why May 2010?
Hatoyama: With the US expectation to settle the issue by the end of 2009, I could not postpone things for a whole year; the maximum would have been half a year. The budget bill would tie us up until March, and there was the circumstance involving SDP (Social Democratic Party).13 Having Futenma relocation as an election issue would have made it impossible to contest the Upper House election. I wanted to go to the US to negotiate directly (with President. Obama) in early May, but we (as a government) did not yet have a coherent alternative plan.
Q. Did the sinking of the South Korean warship (Cheonan) affect the decision (to go back to the Henoko plan)?
Hatoyama: The threat of North Korea was real to me then. It was an act of war in a way. That incident certainly worked as a lever to move the whole plan back to Henoko.
Q. What did you mean when you told us you had a “plan in mind”?14
Hatoyama: I used that phrase because I wanted to find a place for Futenma relocation on Tokunoshima Island. The US military eventually replied that part of the Marines’ training could be transferred to Tokunoshima, so the idea of “Tokunoshima” is preserved in the Japan-US agreement (of May 28).
Q. When did you make the final decision to go back to the Henoko plan?
Hatoyama: It was when I gave up on Tokunoshima. On April 28, I met with Tokuda Torao, former Diet member (from Tokunoshima) but I could not gain his support. The possibility of Tokunoshima was completely blocked from that point. I thought I would be able to solve the problem if Okinawa, together with the Japanese and US governments, were to form a consultative council and create a platform to discuss the government’s ideas. But when I met Governor Nakaima for the second time in May, he told me that he would not able to do it before the gubernatorial election (in November 2010). I gave up then, thinking there was no way to attain Okinawan understanding.
Q. What is your suggestion for future negotiations?
Hatoyama: Any replacement base should not be made permanent. Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano and I had come to an understanding that we must not let the US military use this facility in perpetuity. Okinawa does not consent. In order to gain their understanding, there has to be some way to negotiate, for example to make this base temporary, even if such a condition was not included in the Japan-US agreement. Even if a relocation site was to be a certain distance away from Okinawa, so long as it is part of a single package (with the US military), it would work as a “deterrent.”
Q. What is your overall reflection?
Hatoyama: Our counterpart should have been the US, not Okinawa. I should have gone there first. I should have been more assertive, presenting my plan as the only possible plan. Mr. Obama himself was probably surrounded by voices that told him the only option was to hew to the status quo (the existing US/Japan agreement). Both Japan and the US lacked political leadership on this issue.
********************************************
日本語関連記事
琉球新報
「抑止力は方便」断念理由後付け 鳩山前首相、普天間で証言 http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-173438-storytopic-53.html
鳩山前首相一問一答 見通しなく「県外」発言
http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-173440-storytopic-53.html
“抑止力は方便“鳩山氏に不信再び 県内関係者「地元で声聞いて」
http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-173444-storytopic-53.html
「発言責任持って」県外執着も“人ごと” 鳩山氏「県民に申し訳ない」
http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-173443-storytopic-53.html
沖縄タイムス
鳩山氏「抑止力は方便」本紙インタビュー
http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/article/2011-02-13_14499/
「軽い」前首相に怒り
後悔するより日米合意見直しを
名護や宜野湾 市民ら責任指摘
http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/article/2011-02-13_14517/
［解説］「脱官僚」内実は依存
http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/article/2011-02-13_14504/
頓挫した県外の理念 徳之島拒否で窮地に
http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/article/2011-02-13_14503/
Friday, February 11, 2011
Media Criticism by Yoshida Kensei これでもジャーナリストか by 吉田健正
Okinawan journalist Yoshida Kensei's criticism of Kyodo News Agency's interview article of Dennis Blair, former top US Intelligence official (February 8, 2011).
沖縄在住のジャーナリスト、元桜美林大学教授、吉田健正さんに寄稿いただきました。共同通信ワシントン発の記事に関するメディア批判です。（元の記事は下記を参照）。
これでもジャーナリストか
吉田健正
語るに落ちる、というのはこういうことを指すのだろう。
共同通信の杉田雄心ワシントン特派員によれば、日米同盟に支障を来たさないため、「米政府は（日本に対する）圧力と取られかねない発言を極力封印する」という（『沖縄タイムス』、『琉球新報』、2月8日）。「ブレア氏の発言はこうした中で飛び出した」。
ブレア氏の発言というのは、昨年5月まで米国家情報長官を務めたデニス・ブレア氏が、2月初めに共同通信との「単独会見」で、日本に憲法9条の「見直しを促した」という発言である。
米国政府が日米同盟深化の観点から、こうした対日要求を「極力封印」していたのに、杉田特派員との「単独会見」に応じたブレア氏が、封印を破り、米国政府の「本音」を語った、というのである。「単独会見」というのは、報道機関が注目に値する特定の人物の見解を求めて行うか、特定の人物が自分の見解を発表するために報道機関に接触して実現するインタビューのことである。つまり、両者の利益が合致して成立する。今回の「単独会見」はどちらが接近して成立したか明らかでないが、いずれにせよ、杉田特派員が、ブレア退役海軍大将との会見に成功して、ジャパン・ハンドラーズとしてたびたび日本の主要メディアに登場したリチャード・アーミテージ元国務副長官と同じ「9条見直し」発言を獲得・報道したというわけである。
ブレア氏に関する報道は、通常の記事と解説からなっているが、中身を読むと、杉田記者側が9条見直し論者のブレア氏に接近して単独会見に持ち込み、ブレア氏の発言を「米政府の本音」と見て、自らの同調意見を加えて発表した、ことがうかがえる。あるいは、杉田記者なら自分の発言を好意的にとりあげてくれると睨んだ前国家情報長官が、同記者にアプローチした可能性もある。
記事は、バランスを欠いた日米安全保障体制に関するブレア氏（記事によれば、99年から3年間、「米太平洋軍司令官を務め、日米関係に精通。09年1月から昨年5月まで、「中央情報局（CIA）など米情報機関を統括する国家情報長官」」の発言を紹介した後、次のように書く。
「（ブレア氏の発言は）北朝鮮の核・ミサイルの脅威が高まる中、『非対称』とされる日米安保体制の在り方をめぐり、米側に不満がくすぶっている現状を浮き彫りにした」
ブレア氏との「単独会見」が「米側に不満がくすぶっている現状を浮き彫りにした」とは、恐るべき報道である。
また「解説」では、ブレア氏が日本に憲法9条の見直しを「促し」たことは、「「外交辞令の裏に潜む米側の『本音』を代弁したと言える。菅直人首相は、国会答弁で集団的自衛権の行使を禁じる政府の憲法解釈見直しを否定しており、日米同盟の将来像をめぐる両国の溝を浮き彫りにした」と書く。ブレア氏の発言が米側の「本音」を「代弁」した、というのには、恐れ入った。
ブレア氏一人の発言がなぜ「米側の不満」を言い表し、それがなぜ「不満がくすぶっている現状」を明らかにした、と総括できるのか。ブレア氏の発言と杉田記者の解釈は、どういう事実や政府内議論に裏付けられているのか、示されていない。情報の「ウラ」をとった形跡もない。
一見、公式の場では語られることのない両国の見解の相違を伝えて、読者の思考を刺激するという体裁をとっている。しかし、その後の「米側には、日本の人的国際貢献への不満がくすぶっている」、「（こうした不満）の背景には、史上最大規模の財政赤字を抱えるオバマ政権が国防予算削減を求められ、余裕を失いつつあるという事情がある」とか、菅政権の防衛費の5年間据え置き方針は「米側には『期待外れ』（日米関係筋）と映る」という説明には、元軍人・ブレア氏の視点で米国の軍事的利益を代弁した「解説」にしか見えない。一人の退役軍人の発言を米国の「本音」として報道するやり方には、単に日本の読者を「洗脳」しようという意図があるようにしか見えない。
駐米特派員の身分で、杉田氏は、「日米同盟深化」が米側の「期待外れ」に終わらないよう、「同床異夢」にならないよう、日本は米国の「本音」にしたがって憲法９条を改定すべし、というのだろうか。ブレア氏が唱える日本の軍備強化や米軍支援のための海外派兵は、日本の「国益」になるのだろうか。近隣アジア諸国との関係はどうなるのだろうか。日本の世論はどう反応するのだろうか。
杉田特派員は、日本のジャーナリストというより、軍事的視点から日本国憲法の改定を求める一部米国「知日派」のエージェント（代理人）としか映らない。日本のジャーナリストであれば、日本の視点から、「日本国民の多くは憲法9条の改定を望んでいない」、「国民は日米同盟を支持するが、米軍基地の駐留にはどこでも反対している」、「世界の民主主義のために戦争するという米国は、なぜ沖縄住民の基地反対の民意を無視するのか」、「なぜオバマ政権は『史上最大規模の財政赤字を抱え』ながら、世界全体の国防費の40％以上を占める国防予算を削減できないのか」といった質問があってもよかっただろう。多くの国民が治外法権的で不公平と考える日米地位協定について、さらには「対テロ戦争」の正当性や有効性、戦争がイラクやアフガニスタン、米国社会に及ぼした影響などについても元国家情報長官に見解を求めるべきだっただろう。しかし、そういう観点からの報道はなく、杉田特派員は「日米同盟」や日本国憲法に関する元長官の意見と杉田自身の「本音」と合致した米国の意向を一方的に伝えたのみだ。
特派員の仕事は、駐在する国や地域の声や動きを読者に伝えることにある。退職した一人の元軍人・国家情報長官に、米側に「くすぶっている（対日）不満」を語らせ、それを「米側の『本音』」と称して、特派員自身が外国政府の「本音」に基づいてあたかもオピニオン・リーダー（世論指導者）のごとく日本に圧力をかけるのは、本来の役割ではない。それでは、一部の外国人の単なるエージェント（代理人、代弁者）に堕してしまう。その外国人が、元太平洋軍司令官で、昨年までCIAや連邦捜査局（FBI）を統括した国家情報長官であれば、なおさら注意が必要だろう。
吉田健正
１９４１年、沖縄県に生まれる。ミズーリ大学と同大学院でジャーナリズムを専攻。沖縄タイムス、ＡＰ通信東京支社、ニューズウィーク東京支局、在日カナダ大使館を経て、桜美林大学国際学部教授。２００６年に退職後、沖縄に帰郷した。近著は『「戦争依存国家」アメリカと日本』（高文研 ２０１０年）
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以下、２月８日の『琉球新報』に掲載された共同の記事。ネットでは４７NEWSで読めます。英語版は Japan Times でよめます。
最後に、このサイトがメディア批判に力を入れているのは、特定のメディアや記者を非難するためではなく、マスメディアには、その責任と影響力の重さを認識しているが故に、政府や権力を批判する役割を忘れず、良心と公正さに基づいた報道をしてほしいという願いがあるから、ということを断っておきます。（PP）
Thursday, February 10, 2011
Stop building V-22 Osprey facilities in Okinawa! 危険で高価：米国も調達中止するかもしれないオスプレイ配備のためのヘリパッド、基地建設は直ちに中止すべき
This post introduces two recent news from the US on V-22 Osprey in Japanese: one over the Air Force generals' disagreements over the cause of the combat crash in Afghanistan last April; and the over on the Center for American Progress recommendation to cancel the Osprey program, due to cost and technical unreliability. See the links and text of the news in English below.
沖縄の海兵隊基地に配備される計画といわれ、その危険性を指摘されているV-22オスプレイは２０１０年４月９日アフガニスタンで、初めて実戦による事故が報告されている。２人の犠牲者を出したそのときの墜落について、米軍内で、エンジンのトラブルかパイロットのミスかでトラブルになっているという報道があった。（下記参照）事故調査の責任者、空軍准将ドナルド・ハーベルは、８月に報告書を書いた後、９月に退職している。『エア・フォース・タイムズ』の１２月２８日、１月５日のインタビューに答え、「自分の頭脳もハートもこれはエンジントラブルだと確信している」と語った。自分の書いた報告書を変更するような重圧が相当あったとのことだ。ハーベルの報告を受けたカート・シチョウスキ中将は証拠不十分等の理由で反論を出していたが、結果的には報告書を承認したという。
また、２月２日、民主党系のシンクタンク「センター・フォー・アメリカン・プログレス」は米国の財政難を受けて「２０１５年までに３５７８億ドル節約する方法」として軍事予算を削減する１０案を出しているが（下記参照）、その中に「V-22オスプレイプログラムを中止する」というのがある。他の機種に比べコストが５倍かかることと、技術上の問題が絶えないオスプレイは、ディック・チェイニーも国防長官時代に「失敗作だ」として４度も調達中止を勧めたという。
オスプレイについては、１月２７日の投稿でも、琉球新報等が報道したように、アラバマの民間空港で空軍が演習したところ住民から苦情が殺到したということと、国防省が数々の部品の欠陥を指摘する報告書が出していることを伝えた。
こういった状況の中で、沖縄の東村高江（ひがしそん・たかえ）の住民の根強い反対にも関わらず、海兵隊北部訓練場にオスプレイ対応のヘリパッド建設の作業を強行している、そして辺野古に「普天間代替」という名目でオスプレイ対応の新基地を作ろうとしている日米政府は一体どういうつもりなのか。昨年秋までオスプレイ配備の計画さえ国民に隠し続けた日本政府は、当然ながら辺野古や高江の新施設計画に向けた環境アセスメントでもオスプレイ配備を想定していない。アメリカでさえその危険性を認め、調達を中止するかもしれないオスプレイ配備のための工事強行は異常であり、違法であり、今すぐやめさせなければいけない。
高江における工事の強行と住民や支援者の抵抗については、ブログ『やんばる東村 高江の現状』で随時報告されている。実際に座り込みに行けなくてもできることの情報も満載である。２月２２日にはまた東京でもデモが予定されている。
PP
オスプレイ調達中止を訴える「センター・フォー・アメリカン・プログレス」のウェブサイト
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/responsible_defense_cuts.html
Cancel the V-22 Osprey program ($10-12 billion by 2020)
The V-22 Osprey helicopter has been long hampered by cost overruns and technical problems. Opposition to the program is bipartisan: the co-chairs of President Obama’s 2010 deficit commission recommended ending procurement of the V-22; during his stint as secretary of defense, Dick Cheney attempted to cancel the program four times, calling it a “turkey.” Like the EFV, technical problems have seriously impaired the Osprey’s performance. A May 2009 Government Accountability Office report found that “in Iraq, the V-22’s mission capability (MC) and full mission capability (FMC) rates fell significantly below… rates achieved by legacy helicopters.” Given the V-22’s high price tag—it costs five times as much as other models—and lackluster performance, there is no reason for DOD to continue sinking money into this turkey. Terminating the program would save $10-12 billion in the next decade.
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/01/air-force-generals-clash-on-osprey-crash-012211w/
以下、２０１０年４月のアフガン実戦でのオスプレイ事故についての関係者の意見の相違についての記事。
Generals clash on cause of April Osprey crash
By Bruce Rolfsen - Staff writer
Posted : Saturday Jan 22, 2011 10:12:48 EST
In a rare public display of disunity, two generals are at serious odds over the cause of a fatal aircraft accident.
The April 9 crash in Afghanistan was the first loss of a CV-22 Osprey in combat. Two of the three cockpit crew members — pilot Maj. Randell Voas, 43, and flight engineer Senior Master Sgt. James Lackey, 45 — died attempting a night landing at a desert landing zone. The co-pilot survived; he has not been indentified. Also killed were a soldier and a contractor — two of 16 passengers in the cargo compartment.
Brig. Gen. Donald Harvel, president of the accident investigation board, said he believes engine problems brought down the special operations Osprey on its landing approach. Lt. Gen. Kurt Cichowski, to whom Harvel answered during the investigation, argues aircrew errors caused the crash.
Harvel cited engine problems in his report; Cichowski wrote a dissent that he released with the report Dec. 15.
Cichowski, a fighter pilot, declined to comment on the dispute. He is now the CIA’s associate director for military affairs; Harvel, a mobility pilot, spoke with Air Force Times over the telephone Dec. 28 and Jan. 5 from his home near Atlanta. He retired in September from the Air National Guard and now works for Delta Air Lines.
“There was absolutely a lot of pressure to change my report,” Harvel said. “My heart and brain said it was not pilot error. I stuck with what I thought was the truth.”
Harvel said Air Force Special Operations Command wanted him to cite the cause of the crash as pilot error because AFSOC didn’t want old doubts stirred up about the safety of the Osprey program, which had three fatal crashes of prototypes and the Marine Corps variant from 1992 to 2000. The Air Force variant has had one other serious accident, caused when an engine bolt vibrated loose during takeoff. The CV-22, though, managed to land safely.
AFSOC declined to comment on Harvel’s accusation. At the time of the April 9 crash and during the investigation, Cichowski was AFSOC’s vice commander.
The dispute will never be resolved because no irrefutable evidence exists to substantiate either explanation: no black box and no eyewitness testimony.
The CV-22’s flight data recorder probably ended up in little pieces when the service destroyed the Osprey hours after the crash. The airmen and soldiers stripping the wreckage of evidence and classified items before the explosion didn’t know the aircraft had a black box, according to the report.
As for firsthand knowledge of what went on inside the cockpit, the surviving co-pilot told investigators he didn’t have a clear memory of the flight’s last 30 seconds.
Harvel came to his conclusion from watching a video of the CV-22 from a camera onboard an A-10 Thunderbolt that was part of the mission. The footage shows haze coming out of both engines throughout the last 17 seconds of flight; Harvel is convinced the “unidentified contrails,” as they are described in the report, are fuel vapors from engines trying to restart. The Air Force did not release the images.
The stresses of flying in the dirt and dust of Afghanistan probably caused the engine problems, Harvel said.
When maintainers checked the power level of the engines April 6, the right one operated at 95.3 percent and left one ran at 99.5 percent. When an engine fell below 95 percent, it had to be repaired or replaced.
After the power check, the Osprey made four more landings at austere sites. On one, the screening system that protected the left engine from blowing sand failed. Each landing would have reduced engine performance, Harvel said.
“Degraded engines could have led to engine failure, surge/stall or insufficient power when a high power demand was required,” he said, adding that he believes the aircrew members knew about the engine problems and flew the Osprey as best they could to a rolling landing. The CV-22 touched down at 88 mph, the report said; it should have landed like a helicopter, with little forward speed.
The plane’s landing gear absorbed some of the impact, with the tires digging eight inches into the desert sand. The plane rolled and bounced for more than 200 feet until it reached a drainage ditch. As the plane’s nose dipped into the ditch, the Osprey flipped over and began breaking apart before coming to a stop 50 feet away.
In his dissent, Cichowski cited several factors ruling out engine failure:
•No one onboard the Osprey or in radio contact with it heard any discussions about engine problems or warnings from the cockpit.
•An analysis of the recovered left engine showed it was working. The right engine was not recovered.
•The V-22 Joint Program Office, which oversees Air Force and Marine Corps Ospreys, concluded engine failure was highly unlikely.
•The crew made several errors, including the pilot flying too high and too fast in his approach; the failure to obtain a weather report warning of a 17 mph tailwind; distraction over unexpected lighting at the landing zone; and self-imposed pressure to make the mission a success.
Typically, the senior officer who convenes the accident investigation board — Cichowski in this case — agrees with the board president’s opinion.
If the senior officer disagrees with the report, he can ask the board president to consider new evidence. Usually the review resolves the differences.
Cichowski received Harvel’s report Aug. 25. On Sept. 30, Cichowski received an analysis from the joint V-22 Program Office that suggested the report underestimated the CV-22’s speed when it crashed.
In a memo dated Oct. 5, Cichowski stated he accepted the report but believed there wasn’t enough evidence to support the conclusion that at least one engine malfunctioned.
Next, the report and Cichowski’s dissent went to Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz, who in the early 1980s served as an MC-130E Combat Talon pilot in the same squadron as the Osprey crew — the 8th Special Operations Squadron at Hurlburt Field, Fla.
On Nov. 15, Schwartz ordered Harvel to review the program office analysis. Harvel spent three days, Nov. 19 to Nov. 21, studying the new information but still came away convinced that engine problems caused the crash.
Despite his strong disagreement with Harvel’s conclusion, Cichowski signed off on the report Nov. 23 because Air Force accident investigation rules left him little choice.
With the investigation finally wrapped up, AFSOC leaders began meeting with families and survivors to explain the conclusions. Usually, the board president handles the duty, but Harvel was not invited.
Harvel was not asked to meet with the service members and families because he had retired, said AFSOC spokesman Lt. Col. Paul Villagran.
Harvel sees the exclusion as AFSOC’s snub of his opinion.
“I thought that they were very wrong not to let me brief the families,” he said. “I had gathered a lot of insight and took extra notes to brief personal stories to each family. I even volunteered to brief the families at no expense to the government. Still, they never even acknowledged me.”
***********************************************
 |
| V-22 Osprey: from Air Force Times |
また、２月２日、民主党系のシンクタンク「センター・フォー・アメリカン・プログレス」は米国の財政難を受けて「２０１５年までに３５７８億ドル節約する方法」として軍事予算を削減する１０案を出しているが（下記参照）、その中に「V-22オスプレイプログラムを中止する」というのがある。他の機種に比べコストが５倍かかることと、技術上の問題が絶えないオスプレイは、ディック・チェイニーも国防長官時代に「失敗作だ」として４度も調達中止を勧めたという。
オスプレイについては、１月２７日の投稿でも、琉球新報等が報道したように、アラバマの民間空港で空軍が演習したところ住民から苦情が殺到したということと、国防省が数々の部品の欠陥を指摘する報告書が出していることを伝えた。
こういった状況の中で、沖縄の東村高江（ひがしそん・たかえ）の住民の根強い反対にも関わらず、海兵隊北部訓練場にオスプレイ対応のヘリパッド建設の作業を強行している、そして辺野古に「普天間代替」という名目でオスプレイ対応の新基地を作ろうとしている日米政府は一体どういうつもりなのか。昨年秋までオスプレイ配備の計画さえ国民に隠し続けた日本政府は、当然ながら辺野古や高江の新施設計画に向けた環境アセスメントでもオスプレイ配備を想定していない。アメリカでさえその危険性を認め、調達を中止するかもしれないオスプレイ配備のための工事強行は異常であり、違法であり、今すぐやめさせなければいけない。
高江における工事の強行と住民や支援者の抵抗については、ブログ『やんばる東村 高江の現状』で随時報告されている。実際に座り込みに行けなくてもできることの情報も満載である。２月２２日にはまた東京でもデモが予定されている。
PP
オスプレイ調達中止を訴える「センター・フォー・アメリカン・プログレス」のウェブサイト
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/responsible_defense_cuts.html
Cancel the V-22 Osprey program ($10-12 billion by 2020)
The V-22 Osprey helicopter has been long hampered by cost overruns and technical problems. Opposition to the program is bipartisan: the co-chairs of President Obama’s 2010 deficit commission recommended ending procurement of the V-22; during his stint as secretary of defense, Dick Cheney attempted to cancel the program four times, calling it a “turkey.” Like the EFV, technical problems have seriously impaired the Osprey’s performance. A May 2009 Government Accountability Office report found that “in Iraq, the V-22’s mission capability (MC) and full mission capability (FMC) rates fell significantly below… rates achieved by legacy helicopters.” Given the V-22’s high price tag—it costs five times as much as other models—and lackluster performance, there is no reason for DOD to continue sinking money into this turkey. Terminating the program would save $10-12 billion in the next decade.
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/01/air-force-generals-clash-on-osprey-crash-012211w/
以下、２０１０年４月のアフガン実戦でのオスプレイ事故についての関係者の意見の相違についての記事。
Generals clash on cause of April Osprey crash
By Bruce Rolfsen - Staff writer
Posted : Saturday Jan 22, 2011 10:12:48 EST
In a rare public display of disunity, two generals are at serious odds over the cause of a fatal aircraft accident.
The April 9 crash in Afghanistan was the first loss of a CV-22 Osprey in combat. Two of the three cockpit crew members — pilot Maj. Randell Voas, 43, and flight engineer Senior Master Sgt. James Lackey, 45 — died attempting a night landing at a desert landing zone. The co-pilot survived; he has not been indentified. Also killed were a soldier and a contractor — two of 16 passengers in the cargo compartment.
Brig. Gen. Donald Harvel, president of the accident investigation board, said he believes engine problems brought down the special operations Osprey on its landing approach. Lt. Gen. Kurt Cichowski, to whom Harvel answered during the investigation, argues aircrew errors caused the crash.
Harvel cited engine problems in his report; Cichowski wrote a dissent that he released with the report Dec. 15.
Cichowski, a fighter pilot, declined to comment on the dispute. He is now the CIA’s associate director for military affairs; Harvel, a mobility pilot, spoke with Air Force Times over the telephone Dec. 28 and Jan. 5 from his home near Atlanta. He retired in September from the Air National Guard and now works for Delta Air Lines.
“There was absolutely a lot of pressure to change my report,” Harvel said. “My heart and brain said it was not pilot error. I stuck with what I thought was the truth.”
Harvel said Air Force Special Operations Command wanted him to cite the cause of the crash as pilot error because AFSOC didn’t want old doubts stirred up about the safety of the Osprey program, which had three fatal crashes of prototypes and the Marine Corps variant from 1992 to 2000. The Air Force variant has had one other serious accident, caused when an engine bolt vibrated loose during takeoff. The CV-22, though, managed to land safely.
AFSOC declined to comment on Harvel’s accusation. At the time of the April 9 crash and during the investigation, Cichowski was AFSOC’s vice commander.
The dispute will never be resolved because no irrefutable evidence exists to substantiate either explanation: no black box and no eyewitness testimony.
The CV-22’s flight data recorder probably ended up in little pieces when the service destroyed the Osprey hours after the crash. The airmen and soldiers stripping the wreckage of evidence and classified items before the explosion didn’t know the aircraft had a black box, according to the report.
As for firsthand knowledge of what went on inside the cockpit, the surviving co-pilot told investigators he didn’t have a clear memory of the flight’s last 30 seconds.
Harvel came to his conclusion from watching a video of the CV-22 from a camera onboard an A-10 Thunderbolt that was part of the mission. The footage shows haze coming out of both engines throughout the last 17 seconds of flight; Harvel is convinced the “unidentified contrails,” as they are described in the report, are fuel vapors from engines trying to restart. The Air Force did not release the images.
The stresses of flying in the dirt and dust of Afghanistan probably caused the engine problems, Harvel said.
When maintainers checked the power level of the engines April 6, the right one operated at 95.3 percent and left one ran at 99.5 percent. When an engine fell below 95 percent, it had to be repaired or replaced.
After the power check, the Osprey made four more landings at austere sites. On one, the screening system that protected the left engine from blowing sand failed. Each landing would have reduced engine performance, Harvel said.
“Degraded engines could have led to engine failure, surge/stall or insufficient power when a high power demand was required,” he said, adding that he believes the aircrew members knew about the engine problems and flew the Osprey as best they could to a rolling landing. The CV-22 touched down at 88 mph, the report said; it should have landed like a helicopter, with little forward speed.
The plane’s landing gear absorbed some of the impact, with the tires digging eight inches into the desert sand. The plane rolled and bounced for more than 200 feet until it reached a drainage ditch. As the plane’s nose dipped into the ditch, the Osprey flipped over and began breaking apart before coming to a stop 50 feet away.
In his dissent, Cichowski cited several factors ruling out engine failure:
•No one onboard the Osprey or in radio contact with it heard any discussions about engine problems or warnings from the cockpit.
•An analysis of the recovered left engine showed it was working. The right engine was not recovered.
•The V-22 Joint Program Office, which oversees Air Force and Marine Corps Ospreys, concluded engine failure was highly unlikely.
•The crew made several errors, including the pilot flying too high and too fast in his approach; the failure to obtain a weather report warning of a 17 mph tailwind; distraction over unexpected lighting at the landing zone; and self-imposed pressure to make the mission a success.
Typically, the senior officer who convenes the accident investigation board — Cichowski in this case — agrees with the board president’s opinion.
If the senior officer disagrees with the report, he can ask the board president to consider new evidence. Usually the review resolves the differences.
Cichowski received Harvel’s report Aug. 25. On Sept. 30, Cichowski received an analysis from the joint V-22 Program Office that suggested the report underestimated the CV-22’s speed when it crashed.
In a memo dated Oct. 5, Cichowski stated he accepted the report but believed there wasn’t enough evidence to support the conclusion that at least one engine malfunctioned.
Next, the report and Cichowski’s dissent went to Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz, who in the early 1980s served as an MC-130E Combat Talon pilot in the same squadron as the Osprey crew — the 8th Special Operations Squadron at Hurlburt Field, Fla.
On Nov. 15, Schwartz ordered Harvel to review the program office analysis. Harvel spent three days, Nov. 19 to Nov. 21, studying the new information but still came away convinced that engine problems caused the crash.
Despite his strong disagreement with Harvel’s conclusion, Cichowski signed off on the report Nov. 23 because Air Force accident investigation rules left him little choice.
With the investigation finally wrapped up, AFSOC leaders began meeting with families and survivors to explain the conclusions. Usually, the board president handles the duty, but Harvel was not invited.
Harvel was not asked to meet with the service members and families because he had retired, said AFSOC spokesman Lt. Col. Paul Villagran.
Harvel sees the exclusion as AFSOC’s snub of his opinion.
“I thought that they were very wrong not to let me brief the families,” he said. “I had gathered a lot of insight and took extra notes to brief personal stories to each family. I even volunteered to brief the families at no expense to the government. Still, they never even acknowledged me.”
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Wednesday, February 09, 2011
John Hallam: What Next After New START Entry into Force? ジョン・ハラム：新START条約締結後の課題は？
Here is John Hallam, international anti-nuclear activist and writer, on the new START, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, signed by US and Russia on February 5, 2011.
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| John Hallam |
WHAT NEXT AFTER NEW START ENTRY INTO FORCE?
PND (Peaple for Nuclar Disarmament) NUCLEAR FLASHPOINTS STATEMENT ON NEW START ENTRY INTO FORCE
John Hallam
February 5, 2011
A few hours later today, at a ceremony at the grand military strategy conference that takes place every year in Munich, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov will exchange 'instruments of ratification' for the New START treaty.
The moment they do so, New START will enter into force, and there will once more be an arms control framework of sorts, as there was until December 2009. The occasion has already unleashed some commentary, with some suggesting that New START not only doesn't go nearly far enough but is not worth having at all because it does not 'really' reduce actual nuclear weapons numbers and because it is associated with a modernisation program that largely undercuts the very purpose of a nuclear arms control agreement. Others argue to the contrary that it undermines US (or Russian) security, or that it puts 'unacceptable' constrains on the US holy cow of missile defence. Alas! It does nothing of the kind - if only it did!
The facts are that as a disarmament treaty, New START is distinctly underwhelming. The reductions it mandates in 'deployed' nuclear warheads are of the order of 30% only, and some argue that Russia at least, would have found its forces shrinking BELOW the levels mandated by New START anyway, new START or no New START.
Hans Kristensen recently pointed out that New START does not actually mandate the destruction of a single nuclear warhead. All it talks about is reducing the numbers of OPERATIVE nuclear warheads, so to satisfy the treaty all that needs to happen is for warheads to be removed from that category and stored in bunkers.
And of course, the treaty manages to count nuclear bombers, which may carry up to 24 warheads as if they are a SINGLE warhead. This means that any number of warheads may be stored on bomber bases, and the number of warheads actually counted will never exceed the number of nuclear - capable bombers at the base.
However, it is fair to say that there is some consensus that we are better off with New START whatever its inadequacies, than we would be if the Congress and the Duma had rejected it. It would have been much better if the reductions were deeper and more real, if missile defence HAD been really constrained, if a path to zero were more clearly embraced, if warheads really did have to be actually destroyed, and above all if that bargain with the devil - the monster modernisation program - had not been associated with the treaty.
But the results of not proceeding with New START would have been in effect to abandon the entire progress however tentative, in the direction of nuclear abolition, that the world has time after time pledged itself to.
And there is now an increasing comment on 'what further progress can we make now?'.
There is talk of proceeding with the FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, stalled in the CD because of Pakistani blocking), and of proceeding with the ratification of the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty).
That there can now be talk at all of 'what's next' is itself an indication of the benefits of having START enter into force. There mere fact that it has done so almost regardless of its content, makes talk of further progress possible.
However, neither the CTBT nor the FMCT look to me like terribly good candidates for further progress. The prospects for movement on either just don't look good enough.
An issue that has hung around in the background as it were, but is of utterly apocalyptic significance and that might have a chance of real forward movement is however, the issue of operational readiness.
The US and Russia STILL maintain over 2000 warheads each in a status in which they can be launched in less than two minutes. This number will decrease slightly under New START. Obama as a presidential candidate, pledged himself to negotiate with Russia to change this.
The Canberra Commission back in 1996, the Blix commission in 2006, an appeal by 44 nobels in 2004-5, and the Evans/Kawaguchi commission in 2009, all urged that nuclear weapons be taken off high alert.
A study done by Bruce Blair, Colonel Valery Yarynich, Generals Esin and Zolotarev, and others, published in the prestigious journal Foreign Affairs, concluded that nuclear weapons in the US and Russia could be de-alerted without the danger of a 're-alerting race' and with overall improvement in strategic stability.
And at the last session of the UN General Assembly, two resolutions specifically called for the reduction of nuclear weapons operating status, with the 'Operational Readiness' resolution sponsored by Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Switzerland being adopted 157-3. (Operational Readiness came about partly as a result of this authors work).
Minimal progress has been made on the US side so far, with the Nuclear Posture Review conceding that, yes, the US DOES maintain its strategic nuclear forces on high alert (after denials during the Bush administration that it even does so), and committing to examine ways in which 'presidential decision-making time' could be increased. Certainly, decision-making time (currently 8 minutes max to decide on retaliation) is the nub of the problem, but to increase decision making time is precisely to decrease the alert level of nuclear forces. You just can't do one without the other.
A number of NGOs and others have written to Sergei Lavrov, Hilary Clinton, and the relevant State Duma and Congressional committees, urging progress on this literally apocalyptic issue as a priority in the post START entry into force era. That letter will be dispatched in the coming week.
John Hallam
Johnhallam2001@yahoo.com.au
John Hallam, People for Nuclear Disarmament Nuclear Flashpoints Project, worked on nuclear fuel cycle/nuclear power issues with Friends of the Earth 1977-1999, in Melbourne 1977-84. Now with People for Nuclear Disarmament Nuclear Flashpoints Project in Sydney, Australia. He originated the texts of over 20 resolutions on nuclear disarmament in the Australian Senate from 1998-2008, plus resolutions on India-Pakistan nuclear testing in 1998 and 2003 in the UK and Brasilian parliaments. In 1999, he worked on a global campaign to lower the operating status of nuclear weapons over the Y2K rollover, resulting in resolutions in the Australian Senate, a unanimous resolution in the European Parliament, and a letter signed by over 600 NGOs and parliamentarians to presidents Yeltsin and Clinton. In 2004/5, together with Doug Mattern of the Association of World Citizens, he put together an apppeal on nuclear weapons operating status that was signed by 44 nobels and endorsed by the European Parliament and that led to the adoption of resolutions in the General Assembly in 2007 and 2008. John has written a number of widely supported letters signed by hundreds of organisations ans parliamentarians on nuclear weapons policy to the Indian government notably in 2003 when nuclear war was a real possibility. This letter resulted in media coverage and in an 'early day motion in the UK parliament calling for a peaceful resolution that became the most widely supported EDM ever. He was in panels at the UN in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, together with Steven Starr of PSR, with detailed papers on nuclear weapons operating status/operational readiness.
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